The present study examines the dynamic principal-agent problem, in an optimal control framework, with an emphasis on the equity issues. It is demonstrated that (a) cooperative solutions will not be ...

Characterizing equilibrium in the contract space defined by the incentive parameter and insurance component of pay under a linear contract, this approach provides a simple and intuitive method for ...

The varying self-interests in the multi-principal model of SOEs makes it difficult for the agent to act in the interests of both principals when they have potentially competing goals and objectives.

This problem arises because the interests of a manager (agent) can — and often do — diverge from the interests of the owners of the business (principal) that he or she is managing.

This is one solution to the principal-agent problem. Often smaller companies are not public and simply cannot offer stock options, but larger public firms can and do.

Neglected in today's debates about automation and the future of work is any consideration of principal-agent dynamics in the settings most open to technological interventions. Although a crude ...

The principal-agent problem and owner-managers: An instrumental variables application to nursing home quality This paper expands the literature on the heterogeneity among nursing home facilities by ...

Neglected in today's debates about automation and the future of work is any consideration of principal-agent dynamics in the settings most open to technological interventions. Although a crude ...